Do we want China to fail? This question was asked at a recent seminar I attended for Western policymakers and commentators.

The group was scrolling through a report for the coming year, when a member of our team asked why one of the risks listed for 2023 was a sharp slowdown in Chinese growth. “Isn’t that what we want to happen?” Asked.

It’s a fair question. After all, the US president has said repeatedly that he is willing to go to war with China to defend Taiwan. The European Union describes the country as “My device competitorBritain officially discusses calling China a “threat.” Surely, if you consider a country a threat and a competitor, wouldn’t you want to see its economy grow rapidly?

Or maybe you do. Those who believe that continued Chinese economic success is still in the interest of the West have reasonable arguments to make. First, China is a large part of the global economy. If you want China to go into recession, you are very close to wanting the world to also go into recession. And if China is going to collapse – for example, if it is Real estate sector Melts – the consequences will bounce back through the global financial system.

Then there is the ethical question. Are you comfortable with the desire of more than 1.4 billion Chinese – many of whom are still poor – to become even poorer? Demand and investment from China is critical to countries in Africa and the Americas. Do you want them to get poorer too?

The fact that such a debate is taking place at all says something about the current confusion in Western capitals. Broadly speaking, two models of world order are locked in a battle in the minds of Western policymakers: an old model based on globalization; and new ones based on great power competition.

The old model stresses economics and what the Chinese call “win-win cooperation.” Its argument is that economic stability and growth are good for all – and they also encourage beneficial habits of international cooperation on critical issues such as climate change.

The new paradigm argues that a richer China has, unfortunately, morphed into a more menacing China. Beijing has poured money into a military buildup and has territorial ambitions that threaten Taiwan, India, Japan, the Philippines and more. This view argues that unless China’s ambitions are changed or curbed, global peace and prosperity will be threatened. Russia’s assault on Ukraine, and the close alliance between China under Xi Jinping and Russia under Vladimir Putin, has reinforced the view that the best lens through which to view the world is now one that focuses on great power competition.

Unfortunately, this is not an argument that can be resolved because both worldviews contain elements of truth. China’s failure could pose a threat to world stability. So is the China that succeeds — as long as it’s run by Xi, or some other nationalist authoritarian.

The way for Western policymakers to resolve this debate is to ask a different kind of question. Les: Do we want China to succeed or fail? But how do we manage China’s continued rise?

Asking the question in this way avoids basing politics on something outside the control of Western officials. It would be unwise for Americans or Europeans to assume that China is heading for failure, any more than it would be more realistic for China to base its policies on America on the idea that the United States might collapse. It is clear that both China and America are facing a lot of internal issues challenges It can – at worst – confuse them. But it would be foolish for either side to assume that outcome.

Rather than trying to make China poorer or thwart the country’s development, Western policy should focus on the international environment, in which a richer and more powerful China would emerge. The goal should be to shape a world order that makes aggressive policies less attractive to China.

This approach has military, technological, economic and diplomatic components. The United States has been most effective in strengthening its network of security relations with countries such as Japan, India and Australia – which would help deter Chinese militarism. Washington’s efforts to prevent China from becoming the world’s technology standard-setter is gaining momentum — but it will be more difficult to coordinate with allies, who fear for their economic interests.

Economy and trade are the weakest of the United States. China is already the largest trading partner for most countries in the Indo-Pacific region. America’s increasingly protectionist mood, and the inability to sign significant new trade deals in Asia, makes Washington’s counteroffer seem less convincing than ever.

The battle of ideas is also important. As the Ukraine war made clear, large parts of the world remain deeply suspicious of Western motives—even in opposition to Russia’s apparent war of aggression.

This is why it is so important for the United States and the European Union to be clear – to themselves and others – that their goal is not to prevent China from getting richer. It is to prevent China’s growing wealth from being used to threaten its neighbors or intimidate its trading partners. This policy has the advantage of being defensible and enforceable.

gideon.rachman@ft.com