Peter Blair and Mischa Fisher have it Smart new paper On Professional Licensing that uses data on millions of potential customers generated by Angi’s HomeAdivsor. HomeAdvisor consumers search for services, the platform knows if a service requires a license in a consumer’s case and tries to match the consumer with a suitable local provider, the local provider can then choose to accept or decline the lead. If a lead is accepted, the consumer and provider then negotiate the price and services—since negotiation is mostly handled offline, the main measure of benefit is the likelihood of the lead being accepted.
Many professions are licensed in one state but not in another (as I noted in My talk about professional licensing For a Heritage Foundation, that’s odd if you think there are strong arguments for professional licensing on safety or quality grounds). Thus, the authors compare the acceptable lead rate in states that require a license to complete a task with the rate in states where the same task is unlicensed. To better control for other factors, the authors compare only the acceptable lead rate in bordering counties of different states, as described below. Authors also control fixed effects for status, month, and task.
The bottom line is that the acceptable lead rate is 12.3 percentage points or 21% lower in a county/state that licenses an occupation/task compared to a similar county/state where the job is unlicensed. In other words, if you live in a state that requires a license to complete a task, it will be more difficult to find a contractor than if you live in a nearby state that does not license the task.
Not surprisingly, the authors find that the acceptance rate decreases not because demand for the licensed service increases but because supply decreases when there are fewer licensed service providers. In the long run, we also know that prices go up in licensed industries (for example, my newspaper with Pizzola Licensing in the funeral services industry).
The authors combine their cross-sectional study with an event study showing that after New Jersey requires a license for pool contractors It is becoming difficult to find a pool contractor in a relative of New Jersey to other countries.
The authors concluded:
The current literature on licensing on digital platforms, which consists of three other papers, carefully measured the effect of licensing on consumer satisfaction and safety by demonstrating that customer subjective reports of service quality and objective platform actions for service provider safety do not increase in the presence of licensed service providers, despite the effect Positive licensing on prices (Hall et al., 2019; Farronato et al., 2020; Deyo, 2022).
… Taken together, our findings and those from three other papers examining licensing in digital labor markets indicate that the traditional view of licensing espoused by Friedman (1962)
About licensing in offline markets, for example, licensing is a restriction of the labor market with limited benefits, and it is also held in digital labor markets (Hall et al., 2019; Farronato et al., 2020; Deyo, 2019).
2022). Our work provides a clear example where labor market regulations developed to control the corresponding economy work against the efficiency gains that technological innovation promises to realize the digital economy (Goldfarb et al., 2015).
the post Does Angie recommend the professional license? Debuted marginal revolution.
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