On Valentine’s Day 1945, US President Franklin Delano Roosevelt met King Abdulaziz bin Saud of Saudi Arabia aboard the USS Quincy. It was the beginning of one of the most important geopolitical alliances of the past 70 years, as US security in the Middle East was traded for oil pegged to the dollar.
But times are changing, and 2023 can be remembered as the year when this grand bargain began to transform, as a new global energy order between China and the Middle East took shape.
While China has for some time been buying increasing amounts of oil and LNG from Iran, Venezuela, Russia and parts of Africa with its own currency, President Xi Jinping’s meeting with leaders of the Saudi and Gulf Cooperation Council in December marked the “birth of the petroyuan,” an analyst said. Credit Suisse Zoltan Bozar in a note to clients.
According to Pozar, “China wants to rewrite the rules of the global energy market,” as part of a larger effort to de-dollarize the so-called BRIC countries in Brazil, Russia, India, China and many other parts of the world after weaponizing foreign exchange reserves with dollars in the wake of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
I don’t want? For starters, more oil trading will be done in RMB. Xi announced that over the next three to five years, China will not only significantly increase imports from the GCC countries, but also work for “multi-dimensional energy cooperation.” This could include joint exploration and production in places like the South China Sea, as well as investments in refineries, chemicals and plastics. Beijing hopes to be paid for in full in renminbi, on the Shanghai Petroleum and Natural Gas Exchange, as early as 2025.
This would represent a massive shift in the global energy trade. As Bozar points out, Russia, Iran and Venezuela hold 40 percent of the world’s proven oil reserves, and they all sell oil to China at a deep discount. The GCC countries account for another 40 percent of proven reserves. The remaining 20 percent is found in north and west Africa and Indonesia, two regions within the Russian and Chinese orbit.
Those who question the rise of the petroin, and the general waning of the dollar-based financial system, often point out that China does not have the same level of global trust, rule of law, or reserve currency liquidity as the United States, making it unlikely that it would want to Other countries to do business in RMB.
Perhaps, though, the oil market is dominated by countries that have more in common with China (at least in terms of their political economies) than the United States. Moreover, the Chinese provided something of a financial safety net by making the renminbi convertible into gold on the gold exchanges in Shanghai and Hong Kong.
While this does not make the renminbi an alternative to the dollar as a reserve currency, trading in the petroyuan nonetheless comes with important economic and financial implications for policymakers and investors.
For one thing, the prospect of cheap energy is already attracting Western industrial firms to China. Consider the German company BASF’s recent move to downsize its main plant in Ludwigshafen and shift chemical operations to Zhanjiang. This could be the start of what Bozar calls a “farm-to-table” trend as China tries to get more value-added production domestically, using cheap energy as a lure. (A number of European manufacturers have also added jobs in the United States because of lower energy costs there.)
Petroleum policy comes with financial risks as well as rewards. It should be noted that the recycling of petrodollars in emerging markets by oil-rich countries such as Mexico, Brazil, Argentina, Zaire, Turkey, etc. by US commercial banks from the late 1970s onwards led to many debt crises in emerging markets. Petrodollars also accelerated the creation of a more speculative, debt-based economy in the United States, as cash-flowing banks created all kinds of new financial “innovations,” and the influx of foreign capital allowed the United States to run larger deficits.
This trend may now begin to reverse. Previously, There are fewer foreign buyers of US Treasury bonds. If the petroyuan takes off, it will ignite the fires of de-dollarization. China’s control of more energy reserves and the products from them could be an important new contributor to inflation in the West. It’s a slow-burning issue, but perhaps not as slow as some market participants might think.
What should policy makers and business leaders do? If I were the CEO of a multinational corporation, I would look to regionalize and localize as much production as possible to hedge against a multipolar energy market. I will do more vertical integration to offset the increasing inflation in the supply chains.
If I were a US policymaker, I would consider ways to increase North American shale production in the short to medium term (and offer Europeans a discount on it), while also accelerating the green transition. This is another reason why Europeans should not complain about the Inflation Reduction Act, which supports clean energy production in the United States. The rise of the petroyuan should be an incentive for both the US and Europe to move away from fossil fuels as quickly as possible.
rana.foroohar@ft.com